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The majority of the world's nations have obligated themselves to the requirements of the Rome Statute, which created the International Criminal Court (ICC). The United
States has refused to ratify the Rome Statute and has embarked on a series of efforts designed to undermine the ICC's operations. The United States avoids taking any significant action to resolve its concerns with the ICC, thereby eliminating any hope for eventual cooperation with the international community on this issue. This paper will examine the background of the ICC, and determine how the ICC has impacted recent military operations and foreign relations. This paper will then examine the implications associated with a decision by the United States to ratify the treaty versus not ratify the treaty. Finally, recommendations will be provided on how the United States should adjust its foreign policy to move it closer towards a more collaborative relationship with the ICC.
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: TIME TO ADJUST AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY
In the prospect of an international criminal court lies the promise of universal justice.
--Kofi Annan, UN Secretary General 1 The international community has focused an extraordinary amount of time and effort to establish the International Criminal Court (ICC) as part of its long term vision to establish an institution responsible for advancing international justice. For the first time, an International Court System has been established that has jurisdiction to try individuals accused of committing the most egregious crimes, including certain war crimes and human rights abuses. The United States has long been an advocate of bringing to justice those individuals who commit war crimes and has cooperated with the international community in achieving this shared interest. After the defeat of Nazi Germany, for example, the United States fully supported and led the international effort to prosecute war criminals at Nuremberg.
In the years prior to the establishment of the ICC, the United States clearly supported the idea of creating an International Court System. Congress had even passed legislation that expressed a need to establish an international criminal court. 2 In the developmental stages of the treaty creating the ICC, the Rome Statute, the United
States sent a team to Rome to participate in the drafting of the legislation and resolve its concerns over many of the provisions. However, in the end, the United States did not become a signatory to the Rome Statute because many key provisions could not be agreed upon, including some that arguably failed to protect the rights of American 2 citizens under the U.S. Constitution. In the 2002 National Security Strategy (NSS), U.S.
policy regarding the ICC became clear. The NSS specifically provided the following:
We will take the actions necessary to ensure that our efforts to meet our global security commitments and protect Americans are not impaired by the potential for investigations, inquiry, or prosecution by the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose jurisdiction does not extend to Americans and which we do not accept. 3 The 2002 NSS went even further to address specific actions the United States would take to protect itself from the ICC by stating the following:
We will implement fully the American Service Members Protection Act, whose provisions are intended to ensure and enhance the protection of personnel and senior officials from the United States.
Since the publication of the 2002 NSS, the United States has taken considerable steps to curtail the jurisdictional reach of the ICC, including the withholding of funds from other countries that signed the Rome Statute. U.S. reputation as a persuasive world community leader will likely continue to suffer from such actions and this will likely have a detrimental impact on national interests if it does not change its foreign policy.
The United States risks being replaced by a more credible world leader that better demonstrates its commitment to advancing international justice and the interests of the international community.
Arguably, the United States has relaxed its position toward the ICC since the publication of the 2006 NSS. Instead of continuing a hostile approach towards the ICC, the 2006 NSS is silent on the ICC issue. Instead of emphasizing force and pre-emption, the NSS emphasizes diplomacy and cooperation with the international community. Moreover, there is a notable emphasis on preventing international atrocities and taking action against those who commit such atrocities. 6 Despite the seemingly relaxed U.S. position, the current administration has not yet articulated its policy toward the ICC. In the meantime, the United States remains outside of the ICC and risks further isolation by the international community.
This paper will examine the background of the ICC and the development of U.S.
policy regarding the ICC, and determine how the ICC has impacted recent military operations and foreign relations. This paper will then examine the implications associated with a decision by the United States to ratify the treaty versus not ratify the treaty. Finally, this paper will provide recommendations on how the United States should adjust its policy to move it closer towards a more collaborative relationship with the ICC.
A Brief History of the International Criminal Court
The concept of international crimes has been in existence for centuries. 7 The list of international crimes continues to grow as nations recognize that certain crimes must be afforded the status of international crimes in which any nation could assert criminal jurisdiction. 8 Prior to the development of the ICC, individual countries had sole responsibility to try individuals from their own nation for the commission of an international crime. 9 The trial and the outcome would be governed by the laws of the country where the perpetrator was brought to trial. Naturally, there were strong perceptions of unfairness and partiality when international crimes were resolved in the perpetrator's homeland, particularly when the perpetrator was found innocent or received an unusually light sentence despite overwhelming evidence. 10 In the aftermath of World War I, the international community made its first attempt at forming an international court to try hundreds of suspected war criminals. The U.S. reaction to the ICC has had a significant impact on the international community and military operations abroad. Nations throughout the world voiced their outrage and disgust over the Bush Administration's actions, perceiving them as intentionally designed to interfere with ICC operations. 41 There have been 101
countries that have signed a BIA, but fifty-three have refused. 42 The European Union has even warned its members not to sign a BIA, claiming the agreement is inconsistent with international law and a misuse of Article 98 of the Rome Statute. 43 In 2006, senior military commanders and Congressional representatives urged the Bush Administration to change its policy towards use of BIAs. Not only did the denial of foreign assistance prevent nations from receiving critical funding, but it had an unforeseen impact on international relations. 44 The reactions by both the international community and the U. States has not always been the primary contributor of personnel in all military operations in which it sought immunity for its deployed personnel. In Bosnia, for example, the U.S. personnel contribution amounted to less than one percent of the total UN force. 69 In sum, the United States' actions to protect its own personnel in military operations continue to undermine its ability to claim the high moral ground and influence other countries on humanitarian assistance matters.
Not Ratifying the Treaty -The Implications
The Rome Statute provides that the ICC may exercise criminal jurisdiction over nationals of States not party to the Rome Statute. 70 The U.S. Government and many scholars persuasively argue that the ability of the ICC to exert jurisdiction over non-party
States violates the fundamental principles of international law, thereby infringing upon a nation's sovereignty. 71 Regardless of U.S. arguments to the contrary, the ICC has already exercised Article 12 of the Rome Statute and exerted jurisdiction over nonparties. The ICC's on-going effort to investigate and prosecute senior governmental officials in Sudan illustrates this point. It appears, therefore, that not ratifying the treaty offers no more protection from the ICC. Yet, remaining a non-party State at least affords the United States with a perceived justification, rooted in its own interpretation of international law, to resist ICC efforts to assert jurisdiction over U.S. citizens.
By not ratifying the Treaty, U.S. citizens avoid the numerous pitfalls associated with the ICC's rules and procedures. For example, opponents of the ICC argue that the ICC Prosecutor has unnecessarily broad powers to act and make a variety of decisions without sufficient checks and balances. 72 Specifically, the ICC Prosecutor has the authority to initiate investigations or prosecutions without a referral by the UN Security
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Council or by a State Party. 73 The effect of such broad powers could, arguably, allow the prosecutor to make decisions that are motivated by political reasons. 74 The Rome Statute's complementarity principle permits other nations, even nonparty States, to exert jurisdiction over their own nationals who may have been arrested abroad. The complementarity principle arguably insulates U.S. citizens from being investigated or prosecuted by the ICC so long as the United States is willing and able to "genuinely" carry out the investigation or prosecution. 75 However, the definition of "genuinely" remains open to interpretation. 76 As such, the ICC may still obtain jurisdiction over a U.S. citizen if it determines the investigation or prosecution was conducted to shield the individual from prosecution by the ICC or if it was conducted in a manner "inconsistent with an intent to bring the person concerned to justice."
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Avoiding the ratification of the treaty also prevents the prosecution of U.S. citizens for crimes that are either too broad or too narrow. 78 The crimes, as currently written are arguably not well drafted and could result in absurd outcomes. 79 Also, the ICC arguably does not offer U.S. citizens the same due process guarantees they have in the U.S.
court system, such as the right to appeal a case outside the ICC. 83 The United States demands that its servicemembers and senior U.S. Government officials be protected from the ICC when they are deployed worldwide to protect the nation's vital national interests. 84 The United States fears the international community will use the ICC to question the legitimate strategic and tactical decisions that may have resulted in non-combatant deaths. 85 By not ratifying the treaty, the United States is forced to work out solutions to ensure immunity for its deployed personnel on a case by case basis. However, by doing so, the United States will continually demonstrate its willingness to work against the international community's efforts to collaboratively support the ICC.
Ratifying the Treaty -The Implications
The most relevant implication of signing the treaty is that all U.S. citizens, including service members, would be automatically subject to all the requirements and obligations associated with the treaty, increasing the risk that U.S. citizens would be tried by the broad reach of the ICC's jurisdiction. 86 Nevertheless, there are many organizations and scholars who persuasively argue that the United States should ratify the treaty. Despite arguments to the contrary, proponents of the ICC view the complementarity principle as sufficiently strong to protect the interests of U.S. citizens abroad. 87 For the ICC to assert its jurisdiction over another State's objections, the alleged crime committed must first be one of the few crimes enumerated in the Rome Statute, which include genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression. 88 organizations alleging various crimes. 91 Although the ICC Prosecutor seemingly has broad powers, creating an opportunity for a politicized prosecution, the Rome Statute contains many procedural safeguards to prevent an abuse of powers and frivolous prosecutions. 92 The complementarity principle, coupled with the jurisdictional and other 16 procedural safeguards, were intended to place a check on the power of the Prosecutor and the ICC, thereby protecting the sovereignty of all nations. 93 Many scholars and organizations, such as the American Bar Association, even claim the ICC provides sufficient due process protections, equivalent to those afforded by the U.S.
Constitution. 94 As a party to the Rome Statute, the United States would no longer serve in a nonvoting observer role with limited privileges. The United States would be better able to effect changes to the Rome Statute, ICC procedures, and other matters as a voting member at the upcoming Review Conference of the Rome Statute scheduled for 2010. 95 The United States would also be able to bring additional funding and manpower to ensure the continued functioning of the ICC.
The United States has longed enjoyed a reputation for leading other nations in the struggle for human rights. However, its reputation is in jeopardy if it continues to ignore the treaty. Individuals, NGOs and other nations have continually expressed their displeasure with the United States' refusal to ratify the Rome Statute. 96 Ratification of the treaty would send a clear signal to the international community of the U.S. commitment in the struggle for human rights. The United States would be better able to influence the development of the law of war and gain international support for future operations, instead of being perceived as a country that supports a unilateral approach to international concerns. Ratification would also likely motivate other remaining nations to become party to the treaty. The United States will continue to lose its credibility the longer it continues to isolate itself from the ICC. affairs. 97 The dilemma created by the U.S. Administration not adhering to the demands of numerous large and powerful NGOs would be less of a concern.
Recommendations for Adjusting the Current Strategy
There are a considerable number of suggestions on how the United States should interact with the ICC as discussed above. Given the ICC's favorable track record over the years, and increased international legitimacy, the United States must abandon its hostile, evasive policy towards the ICC and adopt a more cooperative and engaging policy. As discussed below, the Obama Administration should immediately implement the following three courses of action:
(1) Participate as an observer in the 2010 Review Conference of the Rome Statute.
As a non-party observer, the United States has no vote in review conferences but remains eligible to participate in both the Assembly and in Review Conferences. 98 The
Review Conference will give nations the opportunity to consider amendments to the Statute and any other matter, such as establishing a definition to the yet undefined crime of aggression. The United States has the opportunity to express its viewpoints, become involved in discussions, influence other party members and demonstrate our resolve to pursue the struggle for human rights. Ignoring the Review Conference through non-participation does little, if anything, to further our interests.
(2) Proactively engage with the ICC. As a non-party to the treaty, the United States is not obligated to provide assistance or cooperate with any prosecutions or investigations conducted by the ICC. 99 The United States is also not obligated to provide information or documents, or contributions to the ICC budget. 100 We will take the actions necessary to promote universal justice, the rule of law and human rights to meet our global security commitments. We approve of the efforts of the International Criminal Court, and will cooperate and provide assistance to the tribunal to the fullest extent possible while ensuring our interests in protecting Americans abroad is not impaired. We will explore ways to resolve our differences with the ICC and the international community to provide a unified effort in preventing international atrocities and ensuring those who commit such atrocities are brought to justice. However, at the same time, the United States continued to subject countries to foreign assistance cuts for refusing to sign BIAs. 103 The perception created is the United States fails to respect the decisions of other nations while demanding respect for its own.
As suggested by others, the United States must completely review existing agreements and laws, including the ASPA and BIAs, to determine the impact on national security efforts, the effectiveness in dissuading other countries to not join the ICC, and the financial impact on other countries. 104 As part of this review, efforts must be made to strengthen the complementarity principle by examining existing laws and passing new laws to ensure there are no gaps such that the ICC could assert its criminal jurisdiction because of a perceived inability of the United States to prosecute an international crime. 105 Given the time needed to examine all necessary laws, the United
States should nevertheless immediately move forward to ratify the treaty. However, as part of the ratification process, the United States must negotiate some protections to ensure it is given a genuine opportunity to address its domestic concerns. The United We must not allow the legal debate over the technical definition of "genocide" to excuse inaction. The world must act in cases of mass atrocities and mass killing that will eventually lead to genocide even if the local parties are not prepared for peace. The ASPA prohibits cooperation with the ICC and provides specific restrictions, including the prohibition against assisting with the extradition of citizens and permanent aliens; using federal funds for the purpose of assisting in the investigation, arrest, detention, extradition or prosecution of any U.S. citizen or permanent alien; directly or indirectly transferring classified national security and law enforcement information to the ICC; and restricting U.S. participation in peacekeeping missions unless the President certifies that there will not be a risk of U.S. troops being prosecuted by the ICC or that national interests justify acceptance of the risk. The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the surrender. The U.S. is fully entitled not to want to join the ICC and indeed oppose it. The problem here is not US opposition to the ICC, but the fact that UN peacekeeping has been hijacked as a tool to express America's opposition to the ICC. Victoria 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid. The specific language that afforded U.S. personnel immunity in Darfur is provided below:
Decides that nationals, current or former officials or personnel from a contributing State outside which is not a party to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of that contributing State for all alleged acts or omission arising out of or related to operations in Sudan established or authorized by the Council or the African Union, unless exclusive jurisdiction has been expressly waived by that contributing state.
